Project selection, income smoothing, and Bayesian learning by Gaber, Christian
  JOHANN WOLFGANG GOETHE-UNIVERSITÄT 
FRANKFURT AM MAIN 
 
FACHBEREICH WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTEN 
 
  
 
WORKING PAPER SERIES: FINANCE & ACCOUNTING 
Christian Gaber 
 
Project Selection, Income Smoothing, and Bayesian Learning 
 
No. 116 
September 2003  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian Gaber* 
 
Project Selection, Income Smoothing, and Bayesian Learning 
 
No. 116 
September 2003 
 
 
ISSN 1434-3401 
 
 
 
 
Christian Gaber 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt,  
Chair of Accounting and Auditing,  
Mertonstr. 17-25, D-60325 Frankfurt am Main,  
E-mail: cgaber@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de  
Phone: 069 798 23176. 
 
 
* I wish to thank John Christensen, Khaled Diaw, Guenther Gebhardt, Robert Gillenkirch, Volker Laux, 
Christian Leuz, Peter Pope, Dirk Simons, Jens Schoendube and Alfred Wagenhofer for valuable comments. I 
appreciated the comments from the participants of the EAA Doctoral Colloquium in Seville 2003, the EAA 
Congress in Seville 2003 and the SIMT Accounting Research Workshop 2003. Financial support of the 
Schmalenbach-Gesellschaft fuer Betriebswirtschaftslehre e.V. is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
Working Paper Series Finance and Accounting are intended to make research findings available to other researchers in preliminary form,      
to encourage discussion and suggestions for revision before final publication. Opionions are solely those of the authors. ABSTRACT 
 
Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint re-
quires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment 
opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that 
provide managerial incentives for efficient project selection. In oder to motivate a short-
sighted manager to expend unobservable effort and to make efficient investment deci-
sions, the principal sets up an incentive scheme based on residual income (e.g. EVA
TM). 
The paper shows that income smoothing generates a trade-off between agency costs re-
sulting from differences in discount rates and the costs associated with the “congruity” 
of residual earnings. 
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Project Selection, Income Smoothing  
and Bayesian Learning 
 
Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires 
managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportuni-
ties. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide 
managerial incentives for efficient project selection. In oder to motivate a short-sighted 
manager to expend unobservable effort and to make efficient investment decisions, the 
principal sets up an incentive scheme based on residual income (e.g. EVA
TM). The paper 
shows that income smoothing generates a trade-off between agency costs resulting from 
differences in discount rates and the costs associated with the “congruity” of residual earn-
ings. (JEL: M 41, G 31, D 82) 
 
1   Introduction 
In practice, compensation schemes based on accounting information play an important 
role in bringing managers into line with shareholders´ objectives.
1 In particular, residual 
income (e.g. EVA
TM) has received a great deal of attention.
2 For calculating residual in-
come many firms start with accounting i ncome under generally accepted accounting 
rules and subsequently make  adjustments for performance measurement purposes.
3 
When rewarding the manager on the basis of residual income, accounting rules and their 
adjustments are an important device in providing managerial incentives. Despite the 
considerable popularity, incentive schemes based on EVA
TM have not been analyzed in 
                                                 
1   For a survey see ITTNER AND LARCKER [2001]. 
2   This performance measure is closely related to the firm´s market value of equity if earnings are meas-
ured in accordance with the clean surplus principle. See, e.g., PREINREICH [1937], PEASNELL [1982], 
OHLSON [1995]. 
3   Up to 165 adjustments to generally accepted accounting principles are postulated in STEWART [1994]. 
For a survey see YOUNG AND O´BYRNE [2001, pp. 205-268]. - 2 - 
 
situations in which a manager has to make an investment decision between mutually ex-
clusive investment projects. 
This paper will study a setting in which residual income should be able to induce a 
correct project selection. I will examine a multiperiod principal-agent model in which a 
capital investment decision is delegated to a better informed agent. Before obtaining ac-
cess to profitable investment opportunities the manager has to exert research effort at 
his own expense. The principal implements an incentive scheme based on accounting 
information in order to motivate effort and managerial investment decisions that maxi-
mize firm value.  
If the available investment projects are mutually exclusive, the agent will maximize 
firm value if he adopts the project with the highest net present value (NPV). When 
compensating the agent based on accounting information, income smoothing generates 
residual earnings that correctly reflect the ranking of various investment opportunities.
4 
Due to his research effort, the agent is better informed about the NPV of the investment 
projects than the principal. Yet, an accounting system provides the principal with in-
formation about individual cash flows of each investment project adopted by the agent. 
Observing noisy cash flow signals, the principal updates his prior beliefs about the 
NPV. Annuitizing the conditional mean of the NPV generates a smoothed stream of re-
sidual earnings.  
The paper will show that the more signals the principal observes, the better the capa-
bility of residual earnings to reflect the ranking of investment projects. Thus, the infor-
mation contained in the cash flow signals is beneficial to the principal and would lead 
                                                 
4   EGGINTON [1995] shows that representing residual earnings as the annuity of the NPV at each date 
leads to a periodic consistency of earnings and NPV which induces a manager to maintain the ranking 
of mutually exclusive investment projects. 
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him to compensate the agent as late as possible. However, shifting compensation pay-
ments to the future is costly to the principal if the manager is short-sighted and has a 
discount factor that exceeds the firm´s cost of capital. If an impatient manager is paid 
for his personal effort costs at a late point in time, he will demand a premium for late 
compensation. I will show that income smoothing leads to a trade-off between agency 
costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the benefits associated with the in-
formation contained in noisy cash flow signals. 
 
2   Contribution to existing literature 
This analysis builds on prior literature examining the potential of residual income in 
providing managerial investment incentives in multiperiod settings. Part of this earlier 
work shows that residual income can provide optimal investment incentives when the 
manager´s time preference is unknown to the principal.
5 These studies analyze goal-
congruent performance measures which induce an agent to accept only positive NPV 
projects, or to determine the optimal level of investment. Some of these papers find re-
sidual income to be an optimal measure of performance if additional information about 
the growth rate of future cash flows is available to the principal. This information is 
used to construct a depreciation schedule that represents residual earnings as a positive 
constant of the NPV at each and every date. This allocation scheme is called “relative 
benefit depreciation schedule” (RBD schedule). 
The optimality of the RBD schedule is crucially driven by the availability of reliable 
information about future cash flows. LAMBERT [2001] considers the analysis of a multi-
                                                 
5   See ROGERSON [1997],  REICHELSTEIN [1997], [2000]; DUTTA AND ZHANG [2002],  BALDENIUS AND 
ZIV [2003], WAGENHOFER [2003]. 
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period setting in which additional information is not available as an important research 
issue. Following the suggestions in LAMBERT [2001, p. 79], this paper will analyze the 
economic characteristics of accounting rules that do not require information about a de-
terministic growth parameter of future cash flows.  
In REICHELSTEIN [1997], [2000] and DUTTA AND REICHELSTEIN [2002] a manager is 
induced to accept (reject) all projects with a positive (negative) NPV. However, a man-
ager has to reject investment opportunities with a positive NPV whenever capital con-
straints prevent the manager from realizing all proftable investment opportunities.
6 In 
this case, the principal wants the agent to realize the project with the highest NPV. It 
can be shown that the RBD schedule does not induce a manager to make an optimal in-
vestment decision between mutually exclusive projects.
7 Whereas the RBD schedule in-
duces a manager to correctly differentiate between profitable and unprofitable projects, 
this paper studies a setting in which a short-sighted manager has to make a ranking of 
profitable investment opportunities. 
This paper is also related to the analysis in REICHELSTEIN [2000] in which the agency 
costs of a cash flow-based incentive scheme is compared to residual income-based 
compensation. Different accounting rules lead to a different intertemporal allocation of 
economic performance. In particular, performance measurement has wealth effects if 
principal and agent have diverging time preferences. If the agent´s discount rate exceeds 
                                                 
6   GRAHAM AND HARVEY [2001], POTERBA AND SUMMERS [1995] and SCAPENS AND SALE [1981] dem-
onstrate capital rationing to be a realistic assumption. For theoretical explanations see ANTLE AND EP-
PEN [1985], HARRIS AND RAVIV [1996], ZHANG [1997]. 
7   Consider, e.g., two projects A and B that are mutually exclusive. They are given by the cash flow-
tuples A = (-100;+10;+20;+150) and B = (-100;+125;+20;+10). At the firm´s cost of capital of 10 % 
the principal prefers A. Matching the cash investment of –100 and the interest costs according to the 
RBD scheme generates residual earnings for  A of (0;+2.77;+5.54;+41.55) and for  B of 
(0;+34.83;+5.54;+2.77). If com pensation payments are strictly increasing in the performance measure, 
the agent seeks to maximize the present value of future residual earnings. If the agent´s discount rate 
is 20 % (or higher), the manager will prefer project B. - 5 - 
 
that of the principal, then agency costs vary depending on when the manager is compen-
sated. Shifting compensation payments to earlier periods reduces the agent´s time pref-
erence premium and diminishes agency costs. REICHELSTEIN [2000] shows that residual 
income-based compensation at all intermediate periods of the project´s useful life 
economizes on agency costs in comparison to compensation based on the compounded 
value of cash flows. This paper shows that the availability of disaggregate cash flow in-
formation can considerably reduce agency costs even further if residual earnings pro-
vide ideal investment incentives at each date. In this case, compensation based on a sin-
gle residual earnings figure can motivate the manager to work and make a correct in-
vestment decision at lower costs than compensation based on all residual earnings 
available in the course of time.  
Furthermore, this paper shows that including all residual earnings in the incentive 
scheme is beneficial to the principal, if residual earnings do not provide ideal invest-
ment incentives. Using all residual earnings for performance measurement is beneficial 
to the principal because earnings are affected by noisy cash flow signals observed by the 
principal at subsequent dates. These cash flow signals are informative about the agent´s 
investment decision because they contain information about the profitability of the 
adopted investment project. Whereas in REICHELSTEIN [2000] managerial compensation 
at a late point in time generates additional agency costs but no benefits, I will show that 
late cash compensation can enhance the effectiveness of providing managerial invest-
ment i ncentives. The paper discusses a trade-off between the agency costs resulting 
from differences in discount rates and the efficiency in providing managerial investment 
incentives.  - 6 - 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 describes the model. 
Section 4 characterizes possible accounting rules that provide perfect incentives in a 
first best-scenario. Section 5 studies the comparative statics of these accounting rules in 
a second best-scenario in which principal and agent have asymmetric information. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the study.  
 
3   The Basic Model 
In  0 = t  a principal offers a contract to a manager (agent). The contract is designed to 
hire the manager for T periods which exactly cover the agent´s planning horizon. In 
oder to obtain access to profitable investment opportunities the agent has to exert re-
search effort at each date  ] ,..., 0 [ n T t - ˛ . Managerial effort can be interpreted as a per-
sonal investment in firm-specific human capital. Upon recognizing the currently avail-
able investment projects, the agent has to decide which project to accept, if any. The in-
vestment decision is delegated to the agent because he has superior knowledge about the 
profitability of the investment projects. Due to exogenous constraints such as capital, 
time or capacity restrictions the manager can only realize one project each period. This 
requires the agent to establish a ranking of mutually exclusive investment projects. The 
principal would like the manager to accept the project with the highest NPV. 
In order to gain access to profitable investment opportunities, the agent has to exert 
unobservable effort in each period. If the manager does not exert the required level of 
effort, then he does not recognize profitable investment projects by certainty at that 
time. Since managerial effort cannot be observed, the principal cannot assess whether a 
profitable investment project has not been realized in t because the agent has faield to 
exert the required level of effort, or because unfavorable conditions prevented the agent - 7 - 
 
from obtaining access to profitable investment projects. For simplicity, I will assume 
that the agent´s effort choice is binary with  } 1 , 0 { ˛ t e . If the effort variable is  1 = t e  
( 0 = t e ), then the agent has exerted (no) effort in period t. For  1 = t e  the agent incurs 
effort costs at  t e v￿ .  
By exerting effort, the agent independently draws a sample of investment opportuni-
ties from a time-invariant distribution. Out of this sample the agent should be able to re-
alize the i nvestment project with the highest NPV. This means that each period the 
agent selects one project out of the same distribution of investment projects. The current 
investment decision is assumed to have no impact on the set of future investment oppor-
tunities. The ex ante probability that the agent will detect profitable investment oppor-
tunities is denoted  ) 0 )
~
( ( ‡ ” t P NPV f p . The expected value of the ex ante probability 
distribution is a ssumed to be  ¥ < ‡ ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ t t P NPV P NPV E . With a probability of 
) 1 ( p -  there are currently no profitable projects available even if the agent expends the 
required level of effort.  
The useful life of an investment project  t P  realized in t consists of n periods. The in-
vestment project can be represented by the (n+1)-tuple  ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ( 1 0 tn t t t c c c P =  with  0 ~
0 < t c  
denoting the initial investment outlay. The elements  1
~
t c   ) ~ ( tn c  denote the first (last) 
noisy cash flow of the project realized at date t. Provided that the manager chooses 
1 = t e  the expected value of cash flows associated with  t P are known to the manager but 
not to the principal. The last project is realized at date  n T - , which generates cash 
flows from period  n T -  to  T. This means that all cash flows are realized at date 
] ,..., 1 [ T t ˛ . Since the last investment decision is made at date  n T - , the principal may 
want the manager to take outside employment opportunities starting at date  1 + -n T , - 8 - 
 
while the incentive scheme holds the agent responsible for his investment decisions by 
receiving deferred cash compensation for the last n dates. Thus, the planning horizons 
of principal and agent are identical and comprise a space of time from  0 = t  to  T t = .  
At the beginning of each period the principal provides the agent with capital to fi-
nance the accepted investment project. It is assumed that the principal provides the 
agent with a fixed capital budget. Capital rationing requires the agent to make an in-
vestment decision between mutually exclusive profitable investment projects, i.e., out of 
two investment projects with identical cash investments the manager will be motivated 
to select the project with the highest NPV. Table I illustrates the sequence of events be-
tween two representative points of time. 
Table I: Sequence of events 
0 = t   t        1 + t  
                       
                       
Contract 
signed 
Effort  Private  
Information  
Investment 
Decision 
Investment 
Outlay  0
~
t c  
Cash Flow  1
~
t c  
In order to motivate the agent to expend research effort and to make good investment 
decisions, the principal implements an incentive system that consists of a sharing rule  s 
and some performance measure P . Wage payments  t w  are given by 
{ } t t t t t s s w w P + =    , max , for  T t £ £ 0 .  (1) 
The performance measure in (1) can be based on various intertemporally overlapping 
investment projects so that  ￿
-
= - ￿ =
1
0 , ) (
t
i i i t i t P I P P , with  1 ) ( = i P I  if the agent has ac-
cepted a project in period i, and  0 ) ( = i P I  otherwise. In (1)  0 ‡ t w  denotes the agent´s 
wealth constraints. This implies that the agent´s aggregate wage is restricted to positive - 9 - 
 
compensation payments. The fixed wage  t s  is crucially determined by the agent´s par-
ticipation constraint. In order to retain the agent against competitive employment oppor-
tunities, the principal has to consider the agent´s market alternatives by at least provid-
ing him with his reservation utility: 
  0 = = t t u s , for all  T t ,..., 0 = .  (PC) 
The agent is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the present value of future compensa-
tion payments net of effort costs: 
t
A
T
t
t t e v w E U g ￿ ￿ - =￿
=0
] [ .  (2) 
The variable 
t
A g  represents the agent´s discount factor with 
t A t
A r
- + ” ) 1 ( g . The agent 
can be motivated to exert effort only if the present value of future cash payments asso-
ciated with his effort choice is able to compensate his personal effort costs. At each 
date, the principal has to consider the agent´s incentive compatibility constraint which is 
given by 
v P NPV E s p
i
A t ti
n
i
ti ‡ ‡ ￿
=
g P ] 0 ) ( | [
0
.  (IC) 
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral, as well. In this case, maximizing individ-
ual utility corresponds with maximizing firm value. Thus, the agent acts in accordance 
with the principal´s objective if he realizes the investment project with the highest NPV. 
The principal´s utility function is given by: 
t
P
T
t
t t w c E V g ￿ - =￿
=0
] [ ,  (3) 
where  t P t
P r - + ” ) 1 ( g  and  P r  denoting the principal´s cost of capital. The agent´s time 
preference can differ from that of the principal. In particular, it shall be assumed that the 
agent is more impatient than the principal, which can be expressed as 
P A r r >  and - 10 - 
 
t
A
t
P g g >  for all t. Although the principal is not informed about 
t
A g , he knows ex ante 
that  ] ; [
t
P
t
A
t
A g g g ˛ . Differences in discount rates can be attributed to imperfections that 
cause the manager´s borrowing and lending opportunities to be inferior to those avail-
able to the principal. This is frequently considered to be a realistic assumption, since 
capital markets prefer lending to a firm with deeper pockets and more extensive finan-
cial reporting requirements.
8 Due to these imperfections there are no infinitely large pri-
vate banking activities between principal and agent.  
 
4   „First best-incentives“ under symmetric information 
The RBD schedule does not induce a manager to accept the project with the highest 
NPV, because these accounting rules represent residual earnings as a time-variant con-
stant of the NPV, depending on the growth rate of cash flows. In order to motivate a 
short-sighted manager to accept the most profitable project, residual income can be rep-
resented as a time-invariant constant (e.g. the annuity) of the NPV in each period. In 
this case, the agent receives the highest compensation payments in each period if he re-
alizes the most profitable investment project. The special role of this particular periodic 
consistency of residual income and NPV has been studied in EGGINTON [1995]. Repre-
senting residual earnings as a time-invariant constant of the NPV enables residual earn-
ings to reflect the NPV rankings of mutually exclusive projects.  
  Starting with the clean surplus principle that requires all changes in net assets to be 
recognized in net income, residual earnings  ti RI  can be expressed as  
ti ti
P
ti ti B B r c RI + + - = -1 ) 1 ( , 
                                                 
8   See SRINIDHI, RONEN AND MAINDIRATTA [2001, p. 284]. - 11 - 
 
with  ti B  representing the book value of  t P at date  i t+ . For simplicity, it is assumed 
that changes in book value are caused by a single depreciation charge  ti d  with 
ti ti ti B B d - ” -1 . In order to maintain the NPV rankings, EGGINTON [1995, p. 213] sug-
gests the following depreciation schedule: 
￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
- - ￿ - = ￿
-
=
1
1
0 ) (
i
j
tj t
P
t ti ti d B r P NPV c d v , with 
1 ) 1 (
) 1 (
- +
+
=
n P
n P P
r
r r
v .  (4) 
It can easily be verified that the depreciation charge  ti d  is „complete“ since the pre-
sent value of the allocated investment costs equal the initial investment outlay  0 t B . The 
depreciation schedule  ti d  generates residual earnings that represent a time-invariant 
constant of the NPV. Therefore, residual income coincides with the annuity of the NPV: 
) (
1
1
0 t
i
t t
P
ti ti ti P NPV d B r d c RI ￿ = ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- - - = ￿
-
=
v
i
i .  (5) 
Under this accounting rule the project with the highest NPV generates the highest 
performance measure in each and every period. If compensation payments are strictly 
increasing in the performance measure, the agent will be motivated to accept the most 
profitable project at all dates independently of his time preference.
9 This depreciation 
schedule generates residual earnings which are identical at all dates for projects of equal 
profitability. Consequently, both principal and agent are indifferent between projects of 
equal profitability. Yet, this solution requires the principal to be as well informed about 
the profitability of the investment opportunity as the agent. In this respect, the analysis 
of this section can be regarded as a first best-case in which principal and agent have 
                                                 
9   Note, that the depreciation schedule 
ti d  generates efficient incentives for project selection without 
having to restrict the domain of available projects to the class of investment opportunities with only 
positive cash inflows in  n i ,..., 1 = . 
 - 12 - 
 
symmetric information about the project´s NPV.
10 This benchmark can never be at-
tained by taking asymmetric information into consideration. 
  Nevertheless, assume that the agent is compensated based on the performance meas-
ure in (5) which provides perfect investment incentives in each period. For each adopted 
project the principal seeks to maximize the ex ante expected NPV net of compensation 
payments subject to the constraints of incentive compatibility and participation: 
￿
=
- > - > =
n
i
t t ti
i
P ti t t t
s s s P NPV pE s P NPV P NPV pE P V
ti t 1
, ] 0 ) ( | [ ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ ) ( max P g ,   (6) 
subject to (IC) and (PC). In order to solve for the motivation problem, the principal can 
choose a bonus coefficient of:
11 
i
A
i
P t ti s s g g / ￿ = . 
Solving the principal´s problem in (6) leads to the following results:
12 
Proposition 1: Assume that a performance measure  P  provides efficient investment 
incentives in each and every period  n i ,..., 1 =  so that  ) ( t ti P NPV ￿ =v P . If  i
A
i
P g g > , 
compensating the agent in all periods  n i ,..., 1 =  based on  P  generates higher agency 
costs than a single compensation amount in  1 = i .  
  In order to hold the impatient manager at his minimum utility level, cash compensa-
tion has to be the higher, the later the manager is compensated. For 
i
P
i
A g g <  deferring 
cash compensation to the future has wealth effects, since the agent charges a premium 
                                                 
10   In principle, the provision of investment incentives is immaterial under symmetric information. The 
analysis in section 5 below studies the implementation and the comparative statics of income smooth-
ing when the principal is less informed about the profitability of the available investment opportuni-
ties. 
11   An agent whose actual discount factor exceeds the lower bound 
i
A g  will earn rents, which result from 
deferring cash compensations to the future at a higher interest rate. However, due to the performance 
measure in (5) the incentive scheme induces an optimal project selection. 
12   All proofs appear in the appendix. - 13 - 
 
for late compensation. Proposition 1 shows that the accumulated agency costs continu-
ously increase in the course of time. If residual earnings generate efficient investment 
incentives in every period i, agency costs can be considerably reduced by focusing all 
compensation payments on the first period. Since the performance measure provides ef-
ficient investment incentives at all dates, the agent can be effectively rewarded for hard 
work and good decisions already by a single compensation amount at date  1 = i . When 
disaggregate cash flow information is available, compensation in  1 > i  generates addi-
tional agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates, but no benefits. The fol-
lowing section shows that including subsequent residual earnings in the incentive 
scheme brings about some benefits if the principal is less informed about the NPV of 
the realized project.  
 
5.   The income smoothing-solution in a second best-scenario 
In this section, I will analyse the properties of smoothed residual earnings to provide in-
vestment incentives in a setting in which principal and agent have asymmetric informa-
tion. I will first provide a description of the information asymmetry between principal 
and agent. Afterwards, I will analyze the comparative statics of the income smoothing-
solution. 
 
5.1    Representation of asymmetric information and Bayesian updating 
The investment project  P generates a stream of uncertain cash flows  ti c ~ ,  n i ,..., 0 = . 
The variable  ti ti ti c c e ~ ln ln ~ ln + =  is normally distributed with mean  ti ti c c E ln ] ~ [ln = . The 
noise term  ti e ~  is a lognormally distributed random variable. Choosing  1 = t e , the agent - 14 - 
 
can ascertain the parameter  ti c  whereas this information is not available to the principal. 
It is assumed that communication between principal and agent about private information 
of the latter is blocked.
13 Since the agent is better informed about the profitability of the 
investment project, the principal delegates the investment decision to the agent.
14 The 
agent acts in the best interests of the principal if he realizes the project with the highest 
NPV. Assuming, without loss of generality, that the principal´s cost of capital is zero, 
the NPV can be reprensented as the sum of the uncertain cash flow stream 
￿ ￿ = = + = =
n
i ti ti
n
i ti t c c V P N
0 0
~ ln ln ~ ln
~
ln e . 
  In contrast to prior literature, this analysis takes into consideration that the principal 
can have prior beliefs about the NPV. Since all cash flows are lognormally distributed, 
the principal´s a priori beliefs are: 
 
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø + œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø = ￿ ￿
= =
2 ~ ln ~ ln exp ]
~
[
0 0
n
i
ti
n
i
ti
P
t
P c Var c E V P N E .  (7) 
I assume that the principal has implemented an accounting system that provides him 
with information about realized cash flows.
15 In each period, a noisy signal  ti S
~
 informs 
the principal about individual cash flows with 
ti ti ti ti ti ti c c S q e q
~
ln ~ ln ln
~
ln ~ ln
~
ln + + = + ” .  (8) 
                                                 
13   MELUMAD, MOOKHERJEE AND REICHELSTEIN [1992] show that delegating decisions to responsibility 
centers is superior to centralized decision making when communication is limited. 
14   Whereas in standard agency literature the agent is exogenously endowed with private information, in 
this analysis the agent must work to acquire superior information about the profitability of the invest-
ment projects. Similarly LAMBERT [1986] and DEMSKI AND SAPPINGTON [1984]. 
15   To some extent, this assumption is realistic since recent accounting standards in particular tend to re-
quire the availability of disaggregate cash flow information. Besides IAS 7.50 (d) and FRS 1.8 which 
recommend the provision of disaggregate cash flow information at segment level, SFAS 141 also re-
quires the availability of such data when testing goodwill and intangible assets for impairment at re-
porting unit level which might be even one level below segment. 
 - 15 - 
 
The additional noise term  q  embodies a possible measurement error that may stem 
from attributing an aggregate cash flow of various overlapping investment projects to 
individual projects. The random variables  ti e ~ ln  and  ti q ~ ln  are normally distributed with 
mean  0 ] ~ [ln ] ~ [ln = = ti ti E E q e . For simplicity, I assume that all elements of the vector 
( ) tn t tn t q q e e
~
ln ,...,
~
ln , ~ ln ,..., ~ ln 0 0  are pairwise independent. The  ) 2 ( + n -dimensional ran-
dom variable ( ) t S
~
,
~
t V P N  has a joint lognormal distribution with  ( )
T
tn t S S
~
,...,
~ ~
0 = t S  repre-
senting a  ) 1 ( + n -dimensional random variable.  
  In this setting, the principal does not know the actual mean of the NPV. However, for 
generating an ex ante smooth stream of residual earnings the principal can annuitize the 
conditional mean of the NPV at each date  i t+  based on the information available at 
that date. Under asymmetric information, smoothed residual earnings can be written as 
]
~
,...,
~
|
~
[ 0
*
ti t t
P
ti S S V P N E RI ￿ ”v . This representation is characterized by the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2:    For any multivariate lognormal distributed random vector 
)
~
,...,
~
,
~
( 1 tn t t S S V P N  smoothed residual earnings  *
ti RI  associated with project  t P  can be 
expressed as  
= ￿ = ]
~
,...,
~
|
~
[ 0
*
ti t t
P
ti S S V P N E RI v   (9) 
( )
￿
￿
￿
￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
+ + + ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
+ -
￿
￿
￿
￿
ﬁ ﬁ
+ = =
ﬁ ﬁ
= ￿ ￿ ￿
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c E
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1
in    increasing
0
1 for    0
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] ~ [ln
] ~ [ln
~
ln
2
] ~ [ln
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]
~
[ln
]
~
ln , ~ [
tj
tj t
tj S Var
S V P N Cov
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]
~
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£
+
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tj tj
tj
Var c Var
c Var
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The performance measure in (9) consists of three terms within the brace. The first and 
the second component represent a weighted average of the principal´s a priori beliefs 
and the cash flow signals. The impact of prior beliefs and signals on the posterior mean 
depends on a priori noise and the noise of the signal which is reflected by  b : the noisier 
the signal, the lower its impact on the posterior mean. If a signal contains perfect infor-
mation ( 0 ]
~
[ln = i Var q ), all a priori beliefs are discarded. The regression coefficient  tj b  
shows the credibility of the signal  tj S
~
 in relation to the credibility of a priori informa-
tion. The third component represents the principal´s a priori beliefs about future cash 
flows subsequent to date  i t+  for which no cash flow signals have been observed so far. 
 
5.2   Income smoothing and providing investment incentives 
Since the principal is not properly informed about the NPV, smoothed residual earnings 
can only be expressed as the annuitized conditional mean of the NPV. Provided that all 
fixed wages are zero, the agent receives compensation payments based on  *
ti RI :  
{ } t t t s w P ￿ =   ;   0 max  with  ￿
-
= - ￿ =
1
0
*
, ) (
t
i i i t i t P I RI P . 
Since the principal a priori expects the agent to realize an investment project with a non-
negative NPV, the expected performance measure  *
ti RI  is non-negative. As all random 
variables are lognormally distributed and thus continuous in the interval  ( ) ¥ , 0 , the 
agent´s limited liability constraint is met at all dates. Thus, the constraints of incentive 
compatibility (IC) and of participation (PC) remain unaffected.  
  However, the agent´s investment decision crucially depends on the performance 
measure 
*
ti RI . When making an investment decision at date t, the agent expects his cash 
compensation at date  i t+  to be based on the principal´s a priori information and on the - 17 - 
 
observed cash flow signals. The impact of the principal´s prior information on the per-
formance measure entails some inefficiencies in motivating value maximizing invest-
ment decisions. If a priori beliefs have a strong impact on the performance measure, the 
agent is more likely to select that project which the principal believes to be the most 
profitable one. The performance measure entails some non-congruity. In accordance 
with DATAR/KULP/LAMBERT [2001, p. 80], I will denote N to be an aggregate measure 
of non-congruity associated with the performance measure  ti P : 
( ) ￿
=
- =
n
i
t ti t P P V P N N
1
2
) (
~
) (
~
P . 
For  0 = N  the performance measure is said to be perfectly congruent. The non-
congruity of each individual 
* ~
ti I R  is measured by: 
) (
~ 1
) (
~
) , (
*
t ti t P I R P V P N i N
v
- = ß , with  ( ) i b b ,..., 1 ß= .  (10) 
Proposition 2 shows that the weight of prior information in the performance measure 
gradually decreases in the course of time, i.e., the congruity of the performance measure 
depends on 
-   the informativeness of the signals:  0 / ) , ( < ¶ ¶ ß ß i N , 
-   the number of signals observed by the principal:  0 / ) , ( < ¶ ¶ i i N ß . 
It can easily be verified that  0 ) , ( = i N ß  for  ) 1 ,..., 1 ( = ß  and  n i= . The lack of congruity 
generates additional costs in terms of inducing sub-optimal managerial investment deci-
sions. These costs are denoted  )) , ( ( i N ß f  with  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ) , (
~
0 ) , (
~
)) , ( ( > - = ” i N P V P N i N P V P N i N t t ß ß ß f . - 18 - 
 
This definition implies that  0 ) 0 ( = f ,  0 ) 0 ) , ( ( > > i N ß f  and  0 ) , ( / (.) > ¶ ¶ i N ß f . The lack 
of congruity induces the agent to deviate from the optimal investment strategy. By nor-
malizing the agent´s reservation utility to zero the principal´s problem is: 
[ ] [ ] { } t
i
P t ti ti t
s s s i N P I R E s p i N P V P N pE
t ti
- ￿ ￿ ￿ - g ) , ( | ) (
~
) , ( | ) (
~
max
*
, ß ß  
s.t.:  [ ] v i N P I R E s p
i
A t ti ti ‡ ￿ ￿ ￿ g ) ( | ) (
~* ß,  and  0 = t s . 
The comparative statics of compensation at date  i t+  based on 
* ~
ti I R  can be examined by 
comparing a benchmark case ( 0 ) , ( = i N ß  and 
t
A
t
P g g = ) with the second best-scenario in 
which  0 ) , ( > i N ß  and 
t
A
t
P g g > . The following proposition shows the results. 
Proposition 3:   Assume that for  1 = t e  the manager is rewarded by cash compensation 
at date  i t + . Rewarding the agent at date  i t +  on the basis of  *
ti RI  causes agency costs 
of  
 
( ) ( ) ￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
- + ￿ = 1 ) , ( , (.),
i
A
i
P i
A v i N p v AC
g
g
f g f ß .  (11) 
  In line with previous findings, proposition 3 shows that agency costs increase in the 
course of time due to the differences in discount rates. The second term in (11) shows 
that compensating the agent at date  i t +  for his effort costs incurred in t is more expen-
sive than rewarding him in period  1 - +i t . In order to hold the agent at his minimum 
utility level, cash compensations have to increase in the course of time. This component 
would induce the principal to reward the agent as early as possible. If the principal is 
less informed about the NPV of the realized project, the increase in agency costs result-
ing from the agent´s impatience can be traded against the benefits resulting from the 
first term in  (11). Proposition 3 shows that a compensation in late periods also brings - 19 - 
 
about some benefits. Revising prior beliefs based on the signals observed at date  i t +  
reduces the costs associated with the lack of congruity.  
Corollary:   Assume that the agent is compensated based on  *
ti RI  for his effort  t e . In 
each period  n i ,..., 1 =  such a compensation generates a trade-off between the agency 
costs associated with the agent´s time preference premium and the costs due to the lack 
of congruity. This trade-off can be expressed as  
  ( ) ( )
43 42 1
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1
4 3 4 2 1 43 42 1
0
0
0 0
ln ) , (
) , (
) , ( , (.),
>
<
< >
￿
￿
ł
￿
￿
￿
Ł
￿
￿ +
¶
¶ ￿ = i
A
i
P
i
A
i
P
i
A
?
?
v
di
i dN
i N
i N p
di
v dAC
g
g f g f ß
ß
ß . 
(12) 
  The trade-off between agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and 
the costs depending on the congruity of the performance measure can be described by 
the variation of agency costs with respect to time. Whereas a compensation at date  1 = i  
is rather cheap with respect to the agent´s time preference premium, the congruity of the 
performance measure is rather low at that date ( ) 1 , ( = i N ß  is relatively high). However, 
at date  n i =  the weight of the cash flow signals in the performance measure is rela-
tively high, so that the provision of efficient investment incentives is rather probable 
( ) , ( n i N = ß  is relatively low). Yet, at date  n i =  the agency costs resulting from the 
agent´s impatience are relatively high. The enhancing congruity of the performance 
measure can be regarded as a counterpart to the increase in agency costs resulting from 
differences in discount rates. However, due to the benefits resulting from an enhanced 
incentive provisioning my results show that a compensation based on  *
ti RI  in  1 > i  can 
be endogenously justified in the presence of diverging discount rates, even if disaggre-
gated information about realized cash flows are available to the principal. - 20 - 
 
 
6   Conclusion 
Empirical and anecdotical evidence emphasizes that managers have to consider capital 
restrictions when making investment decisions. If a manager cannot adopt all profitable 
projects available, he has to make an investment decision between mutually exclusive 
projects. This paper examines a multiperiod agency model in which a short-sighted 
manager has to exert unobservable effort and make an investment decision between mu-
tually exclusive projects. The manager is rewarded on the basis of residual income since 
both tasks are not contractible.  
  This paper shows that income smoothing induces an impatient manager to realize the 
investment project with the highest NPV. Under symmetric information, perfect income 
smoothing can be achieved ex ante by an appropriate depreciation schedule. Under 
asymmetric information, the effectiveness in providing investment incentives improves 
in the course of time. A key assumption of the analysis is that the principal has estab-
lished an information system that in each period provides him with a noisy signal about 
individual operative cash flows. These signals are informative about the profitability of 
the investment project. Based on these signals the principal revises his prior beliefs so 
that his expectations about the NPV of the realized project become more and more pre-
cise in the course of time. Representing smoothed residual earnings as the annuity of the 
expected NPV causes a trade-off between agency costs resulting from the differences in 
discount rates and benefits associated with the information content of the cash flow sig-
nals. This analysis justifies a continuous residual income-based compensation in a set-
ting in which the manager has a higher time preference than the principal and disaggre-
gate cash flow information is available.   - 21 - 
 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: In order to compare agency costs, I will define a scenario in 
which principal and agent have identical discount rates as the benchmark case. Normal-
izing the agent´s reservation utility to zero and setting  t ti s s =  and  i
A
i
P g g =  and solving 
the principal´s problem in (6) leads to 
v P NPV P NPV pE P V t t t
BM - > = ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ ) ( . 
STEP 1: Compensation at all dates  n i ,..., 1 = . In the second best-scenario it is  i
A
i
P g g > . 
In this case, the principal can choose a bonus coefficient of  
i
A
i
P t ti s s g g / ￿ = ,  (13) 
in order to solve the motivation problem. An agent with a time preference of 
i
A g  can re-
alize rents. Substituting (13), (IC) and (PC) into (6) yields  
￿
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P
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1
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] 0 ) ( | [
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] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ ) (
g
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g P
 
Recollecting terms and setting  ￿ = > v P ] 0 ) ( | [ t ti P NPV E ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ > t t P NPV P NPV E  
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￿
=
- > =
n
i
i
A
i
P
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SB v P NPV P NPV pE P V
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] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ ) (
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This leads to agency costs of 
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STEP 2: Single compensation at date  1 = i . Compensating the agent only in  1 = i  yields 
a principal´s residual of  - 22 - 
 
1
1 ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ ) ( P t t t t t t
SB P NPV P NPV E p s P NPV P NPV pE P V g v > - > =  
s.t.  1 1 ] 0 ) ( | ) ( [ A t t
t P NPV P NPV pE
v
s
g v >
‡ . 
This leads to  
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The agency costs are 
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Both  * AC  and  * * C A  become zero for  i
A
i
P g g = .  
STEP 3: Now, I will show that  ) ( ) ( * * *
t t P AC P AC >  iff  i
A
i
P g g > . Starting with the claim 
gives 
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The claim in Proposition 1 is true iff the expression in (14) holds by strict inequality in 
at least one period  i t+  and by equality in all other periods  n i ,..., 1 = : 
1
1 2 ) (
A
i
P
i
A
i
P
g
g
v
g
g
v
+
‡  so that  1 1 - - ‡ i
A
i
P g g    (15) 
(15) holds for  1 = i  by equality and per definition for all  1 > i  by inequality. This com-
pletes the proof of proposition 1.   1 
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Proof of Proposition 2: The vector  )
~
,
~
( t S t V P N  with  )
~
,...,
~
(
~
0 tn t S S = t S  is a  ) 2 ( + n  di-
mensional random variable. The random variable is  ) , ( log ~ )
~
,
~
( S µ St N V P N t  distrib-
uted, with a finite mean 
2 + ￿ ˛
n µ  and variance-covariance-matrix 
2 2 + · + ￿ ˛
n n S . The 
variable  t V P N
~
 is a one-dimensional random variable and the vector  t S
~
 a  ) 1 ( + n -
dimensional random variable. The mean-vector and the variance-covariance-matrix can 
be expressed as  
 
1 2· +
œ ß
ø
Œ º
Ø
=
n
NPV
S µ
µ
m
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2 2 , ,
, ,
+ · +
œ
ß
ø
Œ
º
Ø
=
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S
.  (16) 
By standard multivariate normal statistics the conditional mean can be expressed as a 
weighted average of a priori beliefs and signals:
16 
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16   See DEGROOT [1970, Theorem 1, p. 167]. For an application to lognormal multivariate statistics see 
KROUSE [1986, p. 327-329] 
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Substituting (19) and (20) into (18) yields a conditional variance of  
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Following equation (7) the conditional mean of the lognormal variables can be written 
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Expressing smoothed residual earnings as the annuity of the conditional mean of the 
NPV with  ]
~
,...,
~
|
~
[ 0
*
ti t t
P
ti S S V P N E RI ￿ =v  completes the proof.  1 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: In order to determine agency costs, I will define a scenario as 
the benchmark solution in which principal and agent have identical discount rates and 
the performance measure is perfectly congruent at each date  n i ,..., 1 = . For this scenario 
the principal´s residual can be written as 
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 In the second best scenario the principal´s problem becomes: 
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Thus, agency costs crucially depend on i: 
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